BELIEF WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
Florian KlauserUniversity of Ljubljana - Faculty of Education
|INDECS 15(4), 242-250, 2017
Full text available here.
Received: 2nd December 2017.
In this article, I set off to explore the question "What is belief?" from a first-person perspective. Finding the explanations in analytical philosophy insufficient, I delve into the phenomenological tradition - starting with Edmund Husserl's concept of the horizon. In doing so, I find that the phenomenological tradition seems to contradict the presupposition of beliefs as representations. Directing my attention to finding an alternative explanation, I present Hubert Dreyfus' explanation of learning without representations, but show that (by Dreyfus' own admission) he does not truly take a decisive step away from representationalism. I present the idea of enaction as a proper alternative to representations. Within this new framework, I present the idea of sense-making as a potential direction towards an answer to the question at hand.
belief, representation, phenomenology, enaction
APA: 2340, 2380
JEL: D83, D84, Z19