SUSPENSION OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
JUDGEMENT OF SCIENTIFIC NAIVETY
Janko M. LozarUniversity of Ljubljana - Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy
|INDECS 15(4), 260-269, 2017
Full text available here.
Received: 27th November 2017.
The article addresses the negative judgements on natural sciences, however persistent and frequent
they may be, found scattered in the philosophical texts of the two founding fathers of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl and Martin
Heidegger. It first presents these harsh views and then, by assuming the phenomenological method, advocated by both philosophers,
endeavours to suspend these judgements in favour of a phenomenologically more adequate description of the scientific comportment,
trying to do justice to its non-philosophical excellence. The basic claim of the treatise is that Husserl's and Heidegger's
criticisms should only be understood in the defensive sense of procuring a firm and safe ground for theoretical comportment,
phenomenology, science, Husserl, Heidegger, suspension
JEL: B29, C99