METACOGNITION AND DECISION MAKING:
BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD PERSON
PERSPECTIVE
Toma Strle
Faculty of Education – University of LjubljanaLjubljana, Slovenia
INDECS 10(3), 284-297, 2012 DOI 10.7906/indecs.10.3.6 Full text available here. |
Received: 8 October 2012 |
ABSTRACT
The aim of the article is firstly, to show how metacognitive monitoring, control
(regulation) and meta-knowledge are important in guiding decision making and secondly, to argue that researching experience
is necessary for a more complete understanding of the role of metacognition in decision making. In the context of dual
process theories of cognition it is sometimes proposed that people usually do not deliberate or reflect on their judgments
and decisions, but rather follow their intuitions. Some metacognition researchers propose that metacognitive experiences
(such as feeling of rightness or difficulty) play an important role in determining whether we change our intuitive
responses for more deliberate, reflective reasoning and decision making. Although metacognition researchers’ contribution
to understanding the role of metacognitive experiences in decision making is valuable, their studies face some serious
problems. Furthermore, it is not only our experiences, but also our evaluations of those experiences (metacognitive
judgments) and our metacognitive knowledge that influence our judgments and choices. I argue that if we want to understand
how and why people decide, we should be studying the entanglement of all these influencing factors from first and third
person perspective. We should also conduct more thorough first person research. I conclude the article by arguing that
first and third person perspective on metacognition and decision making should mutually constrain and inform each other
about insights and contradictions that arise between them.
KEY WORDS
metacognition, decision making, intuition, deliberation, self-observation
CLASSIFICATION
JEL: D81, D83, Z19
PsycInfo: 2340, 2380, 2630